

Peacebuilding in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan: Conflict Management at State Level

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Abstract

Studies focusing on violence in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) conclude that the Russian aggression in 1979 towards Afghanistan, anarchy in post-soviet era, and US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 are the key reasons of spreading of violence in FATA. However, there is a controversy in views about the nature of violence in the bordering areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This paper empirically analyzes three dimensions of wide spread violence in the area. First, it maps the current research and views on the nature of violence in FATA. Second, it examines meta-theories of peacemaking and their relevance to the cultural, social and historical context of the tribal belt. Finally, this paper proposes the policy options for conflict management at the state level in Pakistan.

Introduction

The conflict in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been explored to greater extent and the majority of studies conclude that the current violence in FATA has its roots within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) invasion of Afghanistan which ended up in the Afghan civil war. Soviet invasion pulled the United States of America (USA) into this region. The US won the proxy war in Afghanistan against USSR

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with the involvement of Pakistan and consequently the USSR was disintegrated. The Soviet disintegration created power vacuum in Afghanistan and the ensuing chaos and anarchy caused civil war. The neighboring countries particularly Iran, India and Pakistan participated in this civil war to serve their own national interests through influencing the conflicting groups.

There were many factors which made Pakistan distinctive from those countries that had shown their interests in the Afghan war. The intelligence sharing between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan during Soviet aggression against Afghanistan was *raison d'être* of the importance of Pakistan's role. Another factor was the settlement of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The strategic location of Pakistan and the cultural links among the people residing on both sides of Durand Line are reasons which differentiate the role played by Pakistan from other states.

Pakistan had actively participated in the Afghan war through *Mujahedeen* who were supported morally and materially (Zaeef, 2010). These *Mujahedeen*, after the installation of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, served in many key posts. Pakistan supported the religious groups, which had organized in the name of the *Taliban* under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Umar (Coll, 2004). The intelligence agency of Pakistan trained *Afghan Taliban* inside Pakistan (Zaeef, 2010, pp. 33-34). This might be one of the reasons for Taliban's friendly relation with Pakistan. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan and the US worked together in Afghanistan till the Soviet disintegration (Rooney, 2010). After the disintegration of USSR, the USA did not look back to rebuild the war affected country and left the people of Afghanistan in internal conflict (Rooney, 2010, p. 40). However, Pakistan remained there till the installation of the Taliban government in Afghanistan which was in power from 1996 to 2001 (Coll, 2004, pp. 190-191), (Bajoria, 2011). Therefore, Taliban remained loyal to the Pakistani governments in later years.

The event of 9/11 relocated the US interest in the region. This time *Afghan Taliban* fell into the category of “against” the USA (CNN, 2001), as they harboured *Al-Qaeda’s* leaderships, who were allegedly involved in the 9/11 attacks. Thus, the USA launched global campaign of “war against terrorism” and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan became its first target. The US considered Pakistan's role inevitable in its “War on Terror”. Subsequently, there was military rule imposed in Pakistan and resultantly the cooperation between the USA and Pakistan also increased tremendously. The US considered Pakistan for the second time as a front line ally.

The Taliban government had been uprooted after the US invasion of Afghanistan. Keeping in view the old relations and considering it a safe heaven, Taliban entered into Pakistan’s tribal regions. They had not been supported by the Pakistani government or factions of government this time but the local population of FATA, with whom they had ties since the Soviet invasion of Afghan gave them shelter to carry out their activities.

The international pressure forced Pakistan to take a U-turn towards the Taliban. Since the war was between the US and the Taliban, Pakistan had to support one of the two because the then USA's President G. W. Bush declared both- terrorists and their supporters- as the enemy of USA and called for all other nations to join them in this war against terrorism (CNN, 2001). Therefore, Pakistan joined hands with America, which apparently meant withdrawal of its support from Taliban. In fact, Pakistan's support to Taliban in the past and the subsequent non-supportive policies had roots in the pressure being exerted by the USA. The increased activities of Taliban and other foreign militants brought conflict into FATA. Under the US led war on terror, Pakistan adopted a counter terrorism strategy which attracted military operations at different scales in FATA. The multiple counter terrorism approaches applied by the Pakistani state failed while the conflict resulted in enormous casualties and left 0.37 million families as Internally Displaced Persons-IDPs (FDMA, 2012).

The persisting situation in FATA calls for understanding the nature of conflict and thinking alternatively for peacemaking in this troubled region.

Nature of the Conflict

The people of FATA are wedged in militancy from both sides i.e., from across the border and within the tribal agencies. This militancy has brought a complex conflict to the people of FATA that does not allow them to breathe freely in their region. The conflict confronted security forces, militants and the civil militia. The militancy in FATA has been countered at the state level through various means such as military operations, civil militia actions and through the involvement of local people under the rule of collective responsibility. (The News, 2012), (The Express Tribune, 2012)

The grass root analyses portray that the nature of conflict varies from agency to agency within FATA. There are many factors which make the conflict in South and North Waziristan different to the one in other tribal agencies. There is a clear bifurcation between the pro and anti -government militants in South Waziristan Agency (SWA); the former are led by Mullah Nazir while the latter, called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is led by Hakimullah Mahsud (Rooney, 2010, pp. 37-40). Mullah Nazir is based in the southwest of South Waziristan while Hakimullah is based in the north of the Agency. The ongoing military operation in South Waziristan is directed against the TTP. Mullah Nazir's group is in 'cold peace'¹ with Pakistani military in Wana, the agency headquarter of SWA, where he runs the affairs of Wana Bazaar in the name of '*Aman*'²; while the security forces have been operative (by launching operation Rah-e-Nijat)³ against the TTP in South Waziristan since June 19, 2009. Some security analysts opine that Mullah Nazir's militant activities are comparatively more Afghan-centric than those of Hakimullah. This activism of the TTP, within the boundaries of Pakistan can be observed through the statements of its spokesman Ehsan-ullah Ehsan, who whereby accepts the responsibility for the most of the

militant activities. (The News, 2012), (The Pakistan Today, 2012), (Geo TV, 2012), (Dawn News, 2012)

The most contentious militant group based in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) is the Haqqani network. The Government of Pakistan has been externally pressurized many a times to have military operation against this militant group in NWA where the group is still operating unabatedly.

This may be considered a new front for Pakistan Army if it fights with Haqqani group as the military is already engaged with the TTP in South Waziristan and other regions in FATA. Gul Bahadar, a militant commander, is heading another militant group stationed in North Waziristan. He is somehow similar to Nazir in his operational activities. Therefore, Gul and Haqqani both seem to have an unwritten '*cold peace*' agreement with Pakistani military in North Waziristan⁴.

Kurram Agency has its own kind of militancy where the people have been stuck in sectarian violence. Time and again the inhabitants in Kurram, both Shia and Sunni population, have been striving to get rid of this militancy but according to them, a '*third force*' has hindered the peace process. The '*third force*' usually has been identified as Taliban and other militant groups funded by external factors. The term '*third force*' was expressed in 2011 for the first time when the elders of both sects, Shia and Sunni, jointly held a *Jarga* with a political agent in Parachinar. Both the sects agreed on a verbal peace deal⁵. The term '*third force*' was again used in a seminar discussion in which speakers from Shia sect participated (FRC, 2012). The leadership of militant groups in Kurram Agency is also not stable in their affiliations that has often caused violent incidents and hindered the peace process.

The nature of militancy seems different in the rest of four tribal agencies (Orakzai, Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur) where the involvement of the general population in the counter militancy campaign had resulted in a clash between Peace Committee and militants. Through the formation of *Lashkars*, people became part

of the state's counter militancy strategy. This involvement can be seen more in the northern parts of FATA. In Khyber agency most of the violent incidents occurred between Peace Committee (*Aman Lashkar*) and militants. The majority of casualties of peace committee members also took place in the northern parts of FATA which include Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur agencies respectively. The highest number of casualties (i.e. 22) of peace committee members was reported, in the third quarter of 2012, in Bajaur Agency located in the extreme North while no casualty was reported from North Waziristan and South Waziristan agencies, located in the southern part of FATA. (FRC, 2012) The South and North division is based on the people's involvement in the counter militancy campaign. Involvement starts decreasing from the North to the South of FATA.

Militancy resulted in a huge number of human losses, including military personnel, civilians, militants, and members of peace committee/civil militia (*Aman Lashkar* or *Quami Lashkar*). A large number of casualties among the peace committee members is an incident of concern; sometimes state sponsored civil militia (peace committee members) are left vulnerable to suffer in many regions of FATA. Cross border clashes especially in Bajaur played havoc with civilians, along with the casualties among militants and military and peace committee. Another risk in FATA is kidnapping for ransom and other demands by Taliban. Drone attacks, though the US claims targeting militant hideouts only, also affected the civilian population directly and indirectly. (FRC, 2012, p.6) Keeping in consideration the complexity of aforementioned conflict, it seems pertinent to draw sagacity from the history for the possibility of peacemaking in FATA. History revealed that human beings underwent various levels of conflict; it witnessed some end through applying a certain methodological approach. At this point the discourse analysis of peace theories for conflict management seems inevitable.

Possibility of Peace

The demise of passion to dominate may engender peace and harmony while difference in perspectives may create antagonism, at different levels. However, co-existence with the conflicting ideas is possible with the enhanced-mutual understanding of the origin and nature of conflict. Soft conflict, so to speak cyber conflict or conflict of ideas and thoughts on the other hand is being preferred in the contemporary world as an indicator of freedom, to the violent and armed conflict, though its scale can be questioned.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki incidents reveal a bleak story of history of humanity. The ethnic conflict that erupted in Rwanda took hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and Hutu lives. The plight of the people of FATA in Pakistan is evident from the previous discussion. They are being sandwiched, in an effort to bring just peace, by three stakeholders namely Taliban, NATO forces and Pakistan Army. The armed conflict triggers from marginalization that spurs radicalization, and an armed struggle for identity. “The general lack of understanding or knowledge of the logic of just peace is an issue with normative implications, which, from both idealist and realist perspectives, calls for reflection concerning contemporary use of military force” (Frank, 2007). However there is consensus among the masses that the ongoing war in the tribal regions of Pakistan has to be avoided as it provides “pretext for crime, murder, brutality and self-interest”. (Eramus, 1917)

Peace is not simply the absence of war as defined by realists. It is the presence of ‘justice’ and the nonexistence of ‘terror’ in a society. The absence of political representation, denial of human rights and persistence of absolute poverty, and issue of identity often become the trigger cause of violence. Thus, the process of marginalization fosters conflict while social inclusion prompts peace and harmony. The nations which succeeded in resource distribution enjoy its fruit in the shape of a welfare state at least, if

not a welfare society. Western States have tended to uphold liberal internationalist claims that new international norms, by prioritizing individual rights to protection, promise a framework of liberal peace (Chandler, 2004). These states observe promising human development index that support to establish an ideal, perpetual long term peace and not just a victors' short term forced peace. However, the properties of peace are usually vague, confused and contradictory (Galtung, 1967). "Nonviolence is also about not judging people as we perceive them to be — that is, a murderer is not born a murderer; a terrorist is not born a terrorist. People become murderers, robbers and terrorists because of circumstances and experiences in life" (Gandhi, 2012). The development initiatives based on participation and inclusiveness may cultivate harmony and peace in a society. Peace in the real world's scene exists; it is the particular lens that may observe the peaceful phenomena. Thus, peacebuilding in FATA is also possible but before offering policy options, the analysis of applicability of peace theories is relatable.

Meta Peace Theories

Conflict exists in real world's scene at different scales, due to different motives and causes. Peace could be brought by addressing the root causes. Peace is possible in the real lives of both states and societies; nonetheless the approaches to reach at a peaceful solution have been divergent since peace approaches draw influence from different theoretical discourses.

Realists' Agenda for Peace

Thomas Hobbes, one of the classical realists, noted in 1651 in the *Leviathan* that lives of the people were "nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbs, 1651); this may be referred to as a preliminary point of journey toward theory of peace and justice. It refers to human history of brutality- from where it began its expedition toward a humane aspect. Thus, to the realists⁶, bringing peace in a society or state is only possible by installing a central authority having a legitimate coercive force. Realists' peace is a 'victor's

peace' where states gather and exercise power for their 'survival'. "The resultant version of peace and its sustainability are dependent upon a victor's hegemony". (Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 2008, p57). The realists believe that 'war can only be overcome by Leviathan'. This is a debate rather than a concrete argument but it suggests continuing violence to induce stability by coercive power unlike the liberals' progressive views.

The problem of anarchy perpetuates, as realists assume, because of the lack of a central authority and the undying laws of self-interest that govern human and state's behavior. Thus, with minor differences of opinion, "power, sovereignty, national interest and human nature are taken to be perennial and tragic, reflecting the Augustinian notion of 'fallen man' and, of course, the whole range of normative assumptions upon which this was based" (Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 2008, p40). Thus, there can be no general welfare or security (Wight, 1994). This is the tragic vision of realists' representation for interaction among states and installing peace at domestic as well as at international scenario. This conceptualization rejects the notion of universal ethics of peace. Hobbes argued that:

"for every state war is incessant and lifelong against every other state . . . for what most men call 'peace', this is really only a name – in truth, all states by their very nature are always engaged in an informal war against all other States" (Hobbes, 1998)

Complex realism⁷ sees relations among different actors in a state of perpetual conflict. The rest⁸ of the realism versions see the relations based on quest of power, capacities and other variations including cultural, social, and economic (Doyle, 1997, pp. 44-48)⁹. The conflict management from the realist point of view invites military preparedness only. This is a tunnel view for fostering peace and stability, which ignores the process of conflict management. This approach may only be useful in peacekeeping.

All the coercive means used by the State in FATA indicate that the latter lacks a central/institutional authority which, of course, means anarchy. This approach was also adopted even by the British legislators¹⁰. On the other hand tribal codes (*Pashtunwali*) provide room for distribution of societal authorities among various traditional institutions such as *Jarga*, *Hujra*, *Juma'at*, *Godar* etc. Contrary to the traditional Pashtun laws, realists' definition of anarchic situation is based on self-interest that leads to the principle of survival of the fittest. To establish peace in FATA, the realist approach has been applied by the State that evidently remained unsuccessful for peacebuilding. The application of the realist approach in FATA is evident from military operations conducted in this troubled area.

Liberals' Agenda for Peace

Liberals¹¹ are often termed as 'idealists and utopians'. Unlike Darwinian realists, idealists assume that human nature is pre-eminently good and just and wherever it finds opportunity, it prefers harmony to conflict, at least to violent conflicts. Liberalism and idealism, contrary to realism, offer an ambitious and ethical explanation of peace through liberal internationalism and governance. For liberals, discussion of ethics, interdependence and transnationalism are important factors to foster peace. Since realists believe in preparation for war, for liberalists "peace as well as war, require preparation" (Russell, 1969).

Liberalism presents positive views of human nature and international capacity to collaborate for outlawing of war and disregarding armament. How peace and cooperation is possible, on the basis of reciprocity and identity, defined by Immanuel Kant some 200 years ago (Joshua S. Goldstein, 2009), was followed by his war-raged German nation and other Eastern European countries much later. Scandinavian states are the most peaceful places, though their past was marred with barbarian history. It is still point for theory of justice today, since lives of so many people across the world have exactly those dire features, despite the substantial material progress of others (Sen, 2009).

Kant argued that absence of rule of law at international level and democracy at home trigger wars and trade promotes peaceful relations at all levels. Liberalism offers the possibility of cooperation through international organizations (UN, WTO etc.) that would lead to the realization of peace consequently. Locke focused on individualism and Bentham on utilitarianism; Adam Smith provided the foundations for the arguments for free trade and pacifism; and Kant developed a republican internationalism (Doyle, 1997, p. 206). For liberalists, economic and social transformation would bring peace and harmony. They support trade liberalization that ultimately ends up with 'self-interest', one of the core assumptions of realists. Here we find a close link between liberal and realist paradigms. However democratic norms and trade liberalization will promote peace only if the majority is exposed to offshoot advantages, and may lead to war if it is not. In the countries still outside the liberal fold, cultural resistance to liberal society might reach a point where it is no longer seen as the primary model for development. Then, the liberal peace would expand no longer, and indeed, might collapse where it seems enduring (Fisher M. , 2000).

The main difference between realist and liberalist schools is that realists consider peace as the duration between two wars in which parties prepare themselves for the next war while liberalists ignore the conflict in the society. Liberalists also believe in the non-intervention of state into the affairs of society, which in itself is a controversial thing. The non-intervention doctrine of liberalists leads to non-visibility of state machinery at grass root level. Undoubtedly, conflict exists in FATA therefore the tribal society really needs state intervention so that the issue of law and order is settled down. This assumption of non-intervention or liberal governance suits those societies where violent conflict does not exist, such as big democracies.

Marxist Agenda for Peace

Marxism conceptualizes peace through establishing social justice and emancipation. It explains the structures of classes, class-conflict, capitalism and imperialism. The structures are exploited by the rich and powerful to justify the unequal distribution of material resources, hence create marginalization and social unrest. It argues to reform or remove such hegemonic structures- which are created through realist and liberalist institutions by realization of the actual agency of individuals to create justice (Marx, 1978). The elites' status and resources depend upon the disempowerment of the many. Peace in these terms cannot exist while such structures exist. (Richmond, Peace in International Relations, 2008, pp.70-2).

The Marxist *structural analysis* helps understand sources of violence as well as of peace on the basis of class-conflict. But the paradox¹² of Leninism and Marxism is often located, whereby it provokes the proletariats for violent resistance (revolution) again unequal resource distribution, to perpetuate socialist peace on the basis of equality. The violent conflict among the classes does not help in restoring peace because violence breeds violence, not peace (Khan, 1969). Furthermore, the tribal society in FATA has no such class-conflict which could hurdle peace process, because the tribal codes of conduct do not allow flourishing class differences in FATA. The revolution would be considered as conflict resolution instead of conflict management, while conflict resolution invites military solutions and ignores political, economic and other such alternatives.

Thus, we are least inclined toward accepting a solution for peacebuilding and conflict management advocated by the grand peace theories, i.e. Realism, Liberalism and Marxism. We denounce realism on the grounds that it cannot see beyond the curtain of 'power'; and it provides only military solution that is useful for *peacekeeping*¹³ and to a limited extent for

peacemaking¹⁴ but not for *peacebuilding*¹⁵. The liberalist's formula of over-generalization as "one size fits for all" does not fit into the context where people are exposed to internal as well as external sources of conflict. We also reject peace solution advocated by Marxism as the very basics of Marxist peace engenders through violent conflict (revolution). Thus, none of these meta-theories encompass the holistic move toward peacebuilding and development in FATA. Needless to mention, the fractional derivative from these meta-theories along with indigenous insight may be handy for designing policy-framework for conflict management and/or peacebuilding in FATA.

Conflict Management

Field observations and the existing literature reveal that the conflict in FATA, especially after 9/11, is due to the militants' activities that invited military operations in the area. The conflict can be managed through different ways such as negotiation, dialogue, truce (*Tigah*) etc. The military operations conducted in FATA are the part of State's counter terrorism strategy therefore military operations are a controlled form of peace while the activities of the militants are not something really in control of the State. Since the State bears scope for 'controlling peace', politico-economic and social means are probably the preferable alternatives to coercive means of peacebuilding.

The Political Process: Beyond the Political Development

After the extension of political parties' act to FATA, the next step should be free and transparent elections in the region. Transparent elections would bring hope among the people of FATA where they would choose representatives of their own choice, those who could represent their interests in the main stream government. Transparent elections ensure the process of democracy while democracy means the presence of freedom of expression, assembled along with other human rights (Pakistan Today, 2012). Samuel P. Huntington said "Democracy means two consecutive transparent elections" (Lewis, 1996). Conducting fair

elections to flourish democracy is pre-conditioned with truce to create a favourable environment for public participation in the political process. The persisting militancy in FATA is a big challenge ahead of conducting transparent elections (FRC, 2012). The environment can be achieved by the state sponsored negotiations, dialogues and other non-military processes. (FRC, 2012, pp. 14-15)

Furthermore, collective response of the people to the social issues is an ideal way of solving issues. The advocates of *collective action theory* believe that '*collective response*' is based on the size, nature, homogeneity and/or heterogeneity of group (Oberschall, 2004). Sociologically, FATA comprises of a *homogeneous society* as it has same culture, history, ethnicity and religion (with minor variations). Therefore, it is comparatively easy to achieve a collective response to the social issues (including political, economic) in FATA. This response can also be backed by the State. According to the aforementioned theory, *the cost* (of life and material investment) may make the society hesitant to respond collectively but *the cause* may bring it together. In the tribal society of FATA their cause to bring peace is more desirable than the cost they pay to get rid of the on going tense security situation (FRC, 2012). Therefore a *Grand Jarga*¹⁶ (Council of elders selected by the people from all tribal agencies) free from any influence should be conducted to get an insight into the whole scenario. Before conducting the said *Jarga* there should be local *Jargas* at agency level which would help choose true representatives for the *Grand Jarga*. The solutions for peacebuilding provided by the *Grand Jarga* can contribute to policy design at State level.

Economic Institutionalization

The majority of studies which seek to understand the violence in FATA end up with the notion that poverty and other causes of marginalization are fostering violence in the tribal belt. (Governments of KPK & FATA, 2010). Poor economic conditions are also held responsible for growing militant cadres. In fact,

owing to non-availability of industries and absence of economic institutions to provide employment and business opportunities, population of this region is trapped in illegal occupations like smuggling and drug trafficking. Hence, improvement in the economic situation is inevitable, without which the political struggle to curb the increasing militancy will have a little impact (Zaman, 2005). Institutionalization of the economy increases economic growth by encouraging the key actors in society but a big section of economy in FATA is neither legal nor institutionalized (Wittman, 2006). This state of affairs requires the State's intervention to improve the economic conditions that would contribute to de-marginalization of people in FATA.

Economic institutions may cause conflict of interests among various groups and individuals over the choice of a specific organization (Wittman, 2006, p. 675). However, homogeneous societies show more harmony of interest and in case of FATA, society is homogeneous in every aspect. Therefore, any kind of economic initiatives toward the institutionalization of the economy would be non-problematic in FATA. Further, economic institutions create power centers in society which help in removing the monopoly over economic means and also in overturning the authoritarian into democratic setup (Wittman, 2006, p. 677). Installation of local small level industries would open the window for investment in tribal agencies. Such industries may be run by the government and/or by the people. However, government's intervention is inevitable, and the local people should be supported by the former to initiate economic enterprises (FRC, 2012, pp. 18-19).


De-Marginalization

Marginalization increases the distrust between the state and society while de-marginalization restores confidence. According to the social contractualists, the individuals accept to be ruled under the condition of all kind of protection. Being a citizen of a state means there is a contract between the state and an individual. This contract grants rights and bears responsibilities to be fulfilled.

If any of the two parties violates the terms of the contract, the trust disappears between state and society.

Most of the times, the phenomenon of ignorance and marginalization leads to the emergence of non-state actors. The continued ignorance from government side, by violating the essence of the contract, (i.e. responsibility to protect its citizens) provides enough space for the non-state actors to get people's support. Same was the situation in case of FATA where people remained ignored by the State since the country's inception in 1947. In this case, Taliban and other militant groups allured the local people by providing protections from miscreants (robbers, thief, smugglers etc.); it has been observed that the Taliban or other militants groups occasionally punished miscreants in FATA to earn goodwill in the society. The theory expressed above also suggests that if marginalization or social exclusion fosters militancy in one way or another then de-marginalization can counter it.

The visibility of the state at grass root level may contribute to de-marginalization of the people. The visibility of government in itself is a huge issue to be discussed but here the term means 'reward' and 'punishment'. Rewards and punishment bring certainty in society which further leads to peace and stability.



Counter-Militancy

Pakistan is operating against the militants ever since the latter entered Pakistani territory but it is not in the position of declaring its land to be free of militancy. The active existence of militants in FATA indicates flaws in the Pakistani counter-militancy strategy (Siddiqa, 2011). There are two basic reasons for the flaws in Pakistani counter militancy strategy; one, the policy is driven by military, which has a tunnel approach; two, Pakistan lack clarity on how to define the threat (Siddiqa, 2011). Military approach puts limitations to the scope of policy and there are other approaches which may be more effective than the military approach. Therefore, *population security and counterinsurgency strategy* prefers political solution over the military one (Lalwani, 2009). Pakistan adopted counter insurgency by involving local population through *Civil Militia*¹⁷. The majority of leadership of the civil militia in FATA is the young tribesmen. According to the local people of FATA, target killing was the first step in controlling the local population in FATA. The targeted tribesmen in target killing were elders of their tribes. Local tribal elders are symbol of harmony in tribal society. On the other hand youth are more volatile to violence than the aged population. Youth bulge often refers to the reasons to internal conflict and violence. (Chollet, 2007)

Here, one can easily conclude that young leadership of *Aman Committees* would further become the cause of violence in the area, instead of peace and harmony. Keeping in view the youth's behavior, the policy making body should relocate the role of these youth in building peace; otherwise the situation would grow complex. Furthermore, the phenomenon of civil militia is not very effective in peace building (Wazir, 2012). Militias can be an alternative to the State's Security Forces, but in practice, their impact on public safety is often ambivalent (Mers, 2010). The effective counterinsurgency strategy prefers population's security over attempts to target the enemy (Lalwani, 2009, p. 4), but in the case of civil militia, the population suffers in one way or another.

In majority of cases, of the non-state actors, such civil militia operate without the government's monopoly of force (Mers, 2010, p. 8) In contrast, up to 160,000 military and paramilitary forces are deployed in the FATA for security reasons (Chris Harnisch, 2009). Such an immense number of forces can easily keep peace in the area of almost 3.18 million inhabitants. (FATA, Government of Pakistan , 1998).

Conclusion

The ground realities depict that no single theory is applicable to the peacebuilding process in the current scenario in FATA. In the light of above arguments, it is recommended that multiple solutions can foster peace and development in FATA. The policy of the state of involving people through civil militia for countering militancy needs revision as it ends up with breeding counter militancy. Peacebuilding in FATA requires fostering political process through transparent elections; the importance of Grand Jargas is also undeniable that can contribute to enhance political culture and support designing policy at state level. Improvement in the economic conditions of the people is also inevitable and in absence of economic development, political activities will have a little impact on peacebuilding efforts. De-marginalization and social inclusion through state interventions at grass root level is equally imperative for peacebuilding.

Notes

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- ¹ Cold Peace: It is a state of relative peace between two parties which is marked by the enforcement of a peace deal ending the state of war while the members of at least one of the parties to the treaty continues to internally treat the deal with vocal disgust.
 - ² *Aman* is a process through which militants group (s) governs the affairs of Wana Bazaar, South Waziristan under the central command of Mullah Nazir.
 - ³ Operation *Rah-e-Nijat*: The meaning of the *Rah-e-Nijat* is a 'Path to Salvation' where the military forces intend to eliminate the militant groups from the area

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- ⁴ Peace Deal between Security Forces and Grand Waziristan Peace Jarga (includes heads of militant groups, tribal Maliks, religions leader), agreed in 2007
- ⁵ A verbal peace deal matters a lot in the tribal codes of conduct. Any party that violates the deal, no matter the deal is either verbal or written, faces social boycott by tribal society.
- ⁶ It draws its influences from thoughts of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Morgenthau and Carr, who are considered as the founders and key contributors of realist school of thought.
- ⁷ Doyle has outlined four main aspects of realism: fundamentalist versions stem from Machiavelli, complex versions from Thucydides, constitutional versions from Rousseau, and structuralist versions from Hobbes (Doyle, 1997).
- ⁸ Fundamentalism versions see all humans and states as driven by the quest for power. Structural versions see all states as similar in goals, but not in capacities. Constitutional versions add a concern with cultural, social, economic and politic variations
- ⁹ These variations within Realism offer a narrow concern with moral issues (Thucydides), the probability of imperial expansion (Machiavelli), rational and unitary states which engage in war for survival or at best short-term balancing alliances (Hobbes), and a combination of just social contracts, national interest, isolation, defence and democracy, which may mitigate the general state of war (Rousseau). (Doyle, 1997, pp. 49-160). Thus the followers of the realists' school of thought see peace only through persistent need for preparation of war at domestic level and victor's peace at international level. "Realism has offered an important set of tools to understand security frameworks for states: these insights are an important part of any discussion of peace – but only a part" (Richmond, Peace in International Relations, 2008, p. 57).
- ¹⁰ John William Kaye, one of the authors of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) once said "We cannot rein wild horses with silken braids"
- ¹¹ Liberal approaches draw influence from thinkers such as Kant, Locke, Paine, and Bentham.
- ¹² All the three schools of thoughts, i.e. Realism, Liberalism and Marxism believe in 'Materialism' and share strands of materialism. It is the material / resource distribution either through free trade and open competition or through control of the modes of production by the state that contributes to perpetuating peace. Lenin made the

argument that ‘imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism (Lenin, 1997 (1917)). The same thought was reflected in Morgenthau’s contention that imperialism was the ultimate outcome of realism (Morgenthau, 1968(1948)). Peace, engendered through these views is nothing more than a fantasy. It advocates negative peace where pre-requisite for peace is violence (red revolution).

- ¹³ Peacekeeping is a dissociative approach in which a third party intervenes simply to keep the warring parties apart and maintain the absence of direct violence. (Fisher R. J., 1993)
- ¹⁴ Peacemaking is the process of forging a settlement between the disputing parties. While this can be done in direct negotiations with just the two disputants, it is often also done with a third-party mediator, who assists with process and communication problems, and helps the parties work effectively together to draft a workable peace accord. However, peacemaking is not the final step in the peace process as this approach “does not address structural violence”.
- ¹⁵ Peacebuilding is the activities designed to improve the relationship and meet the basic needs of the parties, in order to deescalate the conflict and render it amenable to peacemaking. It is a “practical implication of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and/or development” (Fisher R. J., 1993, p. 250).
- ¹⁶ Grand Jarga would be temporary body of elders, elected from the Jargas selected by the people from each Agency. It would actually be a Jarga of Jargas, being a representative of the people.
- ¹⁷ Civil Militia is state pampered *Lashkar* (civil militia) in FATA that can be categorize it into five groups; i) encouraged, ii) supported, iii) sponsored iv) employed and v) compelled by the security forces against the militants in the region.

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