

‘Takfiri’ a Messianic Ideology: ‘Counter Measures’ for Radical Insurgents in Waziristan

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Abstract

There are two factors that are flaring up the insurgency in FATA: first is ‘Takfiri ideology’ and second are ‘innocent killings’. This study has covered ‘takfiri’ factor as silent wreckage in FATA and its implication on Pakistan national security and Islamic perception. The study has elaborated its counter measures and means.

“Takfir” is a metaphoric term figured out in an ideological perspective that portrayed Islam as an extreme religion. The study mentions the basic concept of ‘Takfirism’, its catastrophe in Pakistan and most eminently discusses the ‘intellectual counter measures’ of Takfirism.

Khawarij

Khuwarji concept leads people towards misguided lines by the name of Islam. Yet political thoughts direct to the same kind of denial that is attributed to them (Rosenthal, 1953). The Khwarji initiated as a phenomenon and supervision made it as an ideology, which “allows that there may be no Imamh in the world at all.”(Badran, 1910)

In actual practice, the Khuwarji too believes in electing a ‘caliphate’ and to set up a government, however, elementary and rapacious in nature. Their famous slogan “there is no rule but of God” at first glance suggests that there may be no government; but

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what they really mean is that all matters must be decided only by reference to the Quran (Khan, 1973).

And their defined members who use out of context verses and make dual meaning situation to diverse the real essence of verse explain Quran. Later part of Khuwarji is divided into different categories. One of the prevailing category is Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan's (TTP) ideology named 'Takfiri' (Ulph, 2006).

Originally, Takfiri comes from the 'Salafi' school of thought but later on one staunch group has emerged who has abandoned the spirituality & essence of Islam and merely follow the rituals of Islam. In fact, Islamic rituals work only with the spiritual strength where humanity comes first. Thereby, the core assumption of Takfiri is based on 'brutal punishment' against every non practicing Muslim. They do not consider any state law and have defined their laws under the concept of 'Khuwarji' and legitimate their selves to kill those Muslims who do not follow Islamic rituals apparently. Eventually, they have started fighting against Muslims worldwide; have only worked in sullyng the image of Islam (Tellis, 2009).

Takfiri is a chronic disease spread out through 'Khuwarji' and got flared up after Israel's victory in 1967. They made the sectarian issue as Islamic warfare within the Islam. They brought brutality in the hardcore aspects of Islam and decorated mere concept of 'Jihad' only by 'Talwar' (sword) as a mean of success for Muslims. Takfiris consider sin as a great offense against Islam and killing as the only punishment (Vietta, 2013). They consider all sins as 'crime' and every crime has to have punishment without consideration of repentance and state of law. Wherein, Islam has contrition clause even for cardinal sins except 'shirk' (polytheism). Wherein shirk is not a crime in Islam but a great cardinal sin and Allah holds absolute right to punish 'Mushrik' in the hereafter. Indeed, Takfiris become dictator of peoples conscious. In fact, Takfiri's extreme practices nullify this Quranic verse:

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“There is NO enforcement in religion” (Surah Baqra)

As far as Islam is concerned, it cannot be misguided by Takfiri ideology but believers and non-believers are getting ‘wrong impression’ about Islam by them. They are creating ‘Fasad-fil-Ardh’ (mischief on land). This concept is known as ‘Fitnah’ (civil strife) is not new in Islamic history. However, all impartial eminent Islamic scholars have rejected this doctrine. Now- a-days, Pakistan is facing sectarian war which is brutally ruining rule and laws of state, and TTP is spreading their ideology which consists of ‘takfiri’ features. So far, this organization is using Islam as a tool and fear factor to mobilize people against state. They have eliminated the difference between ‘crime’ and ‘sin’ and also diminish the state authority and legislation (Knights, 2006).

Islam distinguished major and minor sins. Islam does not consider all sins as crime but all crimes are sins and state judiciary and constitution has defined laws for crimes. If the state does not follow ‘Sharia’ punishments for defined crimes, then ‘enforcement by violence’ could not be a first resort to promologize any law by citizens. According to encyclopaedia Britannica, “the ‘crime’ is the intentional commission of an act usually deemed socially harmful or dangerous and specifically defined, prohibited, and punishable under criminal law.”

‘Jihad’ is a practically efficient concept of Islam but ‘prime’ jihads are ‘jihad by Qalm’ (effort through knowledge) and ‘Jihad by Naffs’ (effort by self denial). Wherein, Takfiri has made ‘jihad’ as a second name of bloodshed. People who do not keep beard and women who do not cover head or face and attend school are ‘criminal’ as per Takfiri’s definition of criminal or sinners.

There are three scenarios that are performing as positive points for Takfiris in tribal area:

Firstly, the lack of government rule of law which is being strengthened due to sovereignty violations in Pakistan. Secondly,

lack of tribal participation in Pakistan parliament and in judiciary system. Thirdly, tribal status quo and rigid rituals are being cashed by intruders to make them against every evolving systems in state.

Geographical Effects

Research has elaborated the descriptive factors that are rooted in the mind of tribal people by Takfiris and North and South Waziristan are their latest sanctuary. The geographical arrangement of the seven frontier regions of FATA adjacent with Durand Line has political connotations that affect the tribal people in FATA. It makes Afghanistan's legitimacy over that area more relevant, moreover, Afghanistan has given them right of legislation in the Afghan parliament. Therefore, Pakistan also needs to diminish the political marginalization of FATA people. State level efforts are require for weakening them at root level but without power projection.

Relevance with Terrorism

Takfiris gained part in Al-Qaeda's middle leadership. However, Ayman-al-Zawahiri, Tahir Vuldash and Sheikh Essa were the proponents of Takfirism and also have been party to Al-Qaeda (Hegghammer, 2010). Pakistan never faced devastative extreme terrorism before the US invasion of Afghanistan. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is the offshoot of Al-Qaeda's takfiri groups. This ideology was not formed or flared up by 'early Taliban' but the further divisions in Taliban's have occurred after 9/11 and some divisions have adopted Takfirism and transferred to FATA. Therefore, military operations are holding in tribal areas but Pashtun's history empirically gives evidence that military operations have never been a solution for this region (Connor & Schmitt, 2009).

Build Counter Narrative

Primarily, we have to focus on one consensus that counter measures should not take place on offensive or aggressive grounds

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especially when counter measure is building against an ideology. Ideology counter should be ideological and unembroidered (rayyis, 2007).

Firstly, misguided local elements are used by extremist organization. Therefore, local elements could be countered through local 'Mullah'. They could be smooth bridge to communicate with local bodies. Such efforts could be implemented by impartial and learned Islamic scholars who might be a common 'Mullah' of street mosque who has adequate reach to lay man. Local elements are the major strength of Takfiris that are being used by the enemies of Pakistan and Islam to achieve their strategic objectives. Secondly, developmental efforts from government like, trade and efficient transport development are vital as China is carrying out trade and transport development in Xinjiang. This development could flourish individuals mind to think by their self rather than to follow others. Thirdly, politically marginalized people should be facilitated by the state. In this context, fair political participation for politically marginalized people of FATA who are having seats in the Afghan Parliament that is taking them away from Pakistan politically. Fourthly, state level effort required to assimilate tribal traditional customs as a cultural discourse. These classifications could pave the ground for tangible works in that area to establish environment to build counter narrative against 'takfiri ideology' or any extremist group.

Implementation of Above Classifications

An imperative of ideology is based on cognition and cognitive impact could be countered through social construction. Therefore, the state needs to acquire counter strategy on other various aspects of ideological bases to defame takfiri among the new generation. Offensive counter measures cannot be appropriate to counter any ideological effects from minds. To counter Takfiri's influence on these tribes, Pakistan needs to take political measures in the parliament. Their political marginalization is vital reason that makes them to be a part of external influence. Negotiation with

those groups could establish bridges to communicate directly with combatants and indirectly with non-combatants of those tribes. Those bridges might convey counter narrative for takfiri school of thought. There are two factors that have been used in negotiations with FATA elements, one is 'mediators' and second is 'facilitators'. "Mediators are those who do not have any stacks at any side but exchange real messages of both sides and provide a smooth bridge for thorough communication". However, "facilitators are native or politically linked people from concerned region who have concerns on both sides. They try to smooth or least harm situation for further communication and proper negotiation among two most concerned parties". In Pakistan, political religious parties are playing role as 'facilitators' and mediators are not well defined but opposition parties and few local bodies are viable as mediators. For copious negotiation, a hierarchy is required that is first state, second are facilitators and third are mediators. In Pakistan, this hierarchy has made state at the end so state law is being violated all the time. There is no transparent political machinery and the major vacuum of 'no one' has to fill up by state politically transparent machinery. And political support with academic and trade means could securitize the environment. Here state level respect and social equality require for having confidence of local elements of tribal area which would bring political and economic contribution of that area. Ultimately, unity of Pakistan and progress would achieve.

The followers of Bin Ladin's doctrine of "global jihad" were in constant competition for resources with the much more numerous supporters of Abdallah 'Azzam's doctrine of "classical jihad." Global jihadists approved of terrorist attacks against Western targets anywhere, including in Saudi Arabia, while classical jihadists preferred guerrilla warfare in clearly defined war zones, such as Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq. (schmid, 2013 march)

The global jihadist doctrine differed from the "classical jihadist" doctrine developed a decade earlier by the Jordanian-Palestinian ideologue Abdallah Azzam, which called on Muslims

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to join their co-religionists' struggles of national liberation, independently of their respective governments. The classical and global jihadists differed on two crucial points. The first was tactics: the former preferred conventional warfare in confined theaters of war, while the latter employed international terrorist tactics on civilians. The second difference was in the degree of respect for political and religious authority; while most classical jihadists heeded the rulings of senior Saudi *ulama* regarding what constituted legitimate jihad fronts, global jihadists did not. For Bin Ladin and his followers, the regime and its scholars lacked the legitimacy to rule on matters of jihad; hence their objections to jihad in Saudi Arabia should be dismissed. This was a highly controversial stance in a country where religious scholars continued to command tremendous influence and respect. The distinction between classical and global jihadists was highly operational in post-1996 Saudi Arabia and would have deep practical implications.

Three crucial factors shaped the outcome of the jihad on the Arabian Peninsula. The first was the coercive power of the state, the second was lack of popular support for AQAP's project, the third was the Iraq war, which divided the classical and global jihadists to the latter's disadvantage (Arab News , 2003).

De Facto Hegemony over the Internet

Authorities have power of having close look on technical advancement that gave them de facto hegemony over the Internet, i.e.; the telephone network and the road network. Many casualties among police ranks increased the resolve of the security services as well. In short, Saudi security establishment got total revamp because of the May 2003 bombing sparked. The result of these efforts was a remarkable increase in the professed "hard counterterrorism" capability of the Saudi security tools. Change did not happen overnight, but the overall trend was one of considerable improvement.

Takfiri Took Shelter Behind Sectarianism and Ignorance

Islam in itself is a consistent and rational way of life or philosophy, so that no autonomous philosophy can build up within its fold. Therefore, the great and known thinkers in Islam have dedicated their brilliance mainly to the explanation of this philosophy.

Freedom from All ‘Imitations’

Fatawas (religious decrees) by illiterate ‘Mullahs’ are real cause of conflict within Islam. They are frequently responsible for religious and social explosions in different regions. They need to persecute by state’s legal system. There are extreme ends of ‘Ijtihad’(independent reasoning), one is where so-called Mullahs go for innovation in religion which create a new shape of Islam, and second where ‘Ijtihad is being eliminated from Islam. In both ends the major slack is at the end of ‘real Islamic perception’. Takfiri or TTP’s are those who do not believe in ‘Ijtihad’ and also use out of context references from Quran to make the situation or perception as per their will. Such heretical sects were united like the assassins, the Ahmadiyah and the Kisrawaniyan that made a violent perception about Islam.

In fact, the presence and absence of the Imam are the both justified according to the extent of observance and sanctity of moral values prevailing in the community at a particular time (khan, 1973 p-30).

In this order counter measure could not be aggressive because ideological counter measures should be ideological rather than to be violent. Like if we talk about ‘Takfiri’ ideology then we do not need to say that ‘this is sheer ignorance’ or ‘this is the result of lack of understanding’. Albeit, ideological measures could be structure on these words, ‘this is the result of lack of mutual communication or mutual understanding among all’. Or ‘we need to work on independence of thoughts and mutual understanding and mutual communication’. Independence of thought was no less

important a quality which helped one's mental development and built up intellectual personality.

The Theory of Compromise

The Arabs had no idea of nation, nationality or state before Islam. This new religion brought the new idea on the subject that was very different from the existing and past ideas on that subject. The general will of an organized community of believers, which transcended the clan, and the nation. The Ummah which recognized state was potentially global, and the only unified force which ties as one the men of differing traditions, customs, race and nationality was the message of Allah sent to mankind through his prophet (P.B.U.H).

The Shariah, the law of the Islamic state, is consequent of the Quran, the sunnah of the Prophet and the Ijma (consensus) and Ijtihad of the Ummah. The legitimate law of Islam is derived from the identical sources, and is discussed in all the usual works on Fiqh and politico-juridical treatises. Much of disbelief has been transmit in modern times on the nature and essence of the Shariah. It is over and over again said that the Islamic law underwent a long phase of development prior to it being codified into the school of law. Also, a good deal of the law is based on fictitious traditions anticipated back to the prophet to look for religious sanction. No one can deny that a huge number of traditions were bogus during the decisive period of the Islamic law. And no one can question the verity that the Islamic law approved through a consistent process of growth and orientation, before it was formally organized. But one must bear in mind that the Quran did not undergo any process of development.

Political organization is a necessity for mankind - an absolute necessity for the proper working of Islam that the ruler is the shadow of God on earth under whose protection all his creatures live, and that one night of rule is better than sixty nights of no-rule. The effective section of the Ummah must endeavor to

establish the state, otherwise the religion would disappear. In fact solidarity of Ummah gives a fresh basis going back to the Quran and calls it the solidarity in goodness and god-fearing and in the sentiments of unity and fraternity. So far linguistic unity is one of the major factors. This factor could preserve the true religion, and tend to reduce political differences and reduce the ignorance among Muslims. Very important results follow from this concept of solidarity. First there are social consequences. Each member of the Muslim community has the right of existence; if his personal means are known to be insufficient it will be the imperious obligation of the community, under the form of the state or of private initiative, to provide him with material possibilities to live. To allow one of the faithful to remain in destitution is to violate the rights of God by depriving him of one of his servants. Also, politically there exists only a difference of degree, and not of nature, between the functions exercised by the members of the community. In Islam there is no scope for an organized church in the Christian sense; that is, the Muslim clergy, as such, does not represent a special class against the rest of the Ummah, and it is not invested with any authority to control the spiritual life of the believers.

There are two types of obedience: one is 'political obedience' and second is 'moral obedience' and radical insurgents are disobeying on both sides by breaking moral and state laws.

Political Rituals

In Pakistan, we find that dissension over the official role of Islam in the state is no new phenomenon. The sources of such disagreement lie in differing interpretations of classical Islamic legal theory and in the specific historical roles in which South Asian Muslims have found themselves.

The Islamization program of Zia affects social, political, and economic institutions, and breaks down into four areas: economic policies, judicial reforms, the introduction of an Islamic penal

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code, and a new educational policy. It is the effect of this Islamization program that has various reactions.

Classic Social Scientists Assistance for 'Soft Counter Measures'

So far as Muslim philosophers are concerned, Greek thinkers influenced them. But even if they had no knowledge of the Greek legacy, they would have independently arrive at these ideas because the sense of the jama'ah (group) and collective responsibility is so strong in the fundamentals of Islam that no great effort was required to discover and formulate them. That is why they are much more eloquently expounded by Ibn e Sina, Al-Ghazali and Ibn-e-Khaldun than by Aristotle. It must also be born in mind the idea of the state as an emphatic expression of the will of the Ummah, and unnecessary instrument to implement it ideology did not exist among the Greeks. The concept of the Ummah bound by the supreme law of an all-pervading Shariah is exclusively Islamic. Here, Ibn e Taymiyah, who was well read in Greek philosophy, must have been influenced by it, but not strongly as Rosenthal suggests, the nature and content of the Islamic religion were sufficient to inspire him with the sociological approach to the theory of the state; for the way in which he develops this methodology to explain the political philosophy of Islam is much more profound than that of his predecessors. (khan, 1973)

The nature of the religion (din) demands that there must be organized social order where it may function properly. This is apparently the argument of the 'Mu'tazilah'. But where as they take their authority from reason, Ibn e Taymiyah takes his cue from the nature of religion itself and combines it with the socio logical argument, later on developed in great detail by Ibn-e-Khaldun. He says "the good of mankind cannot be realized except in a social order, because everyone is dependent on others, and society requires, indispensably, someone to direct it". (khan, 1973) Ibn-e-Khaldun, the great classical Islamic theorist, elaborated on

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the relationship between the state and religious social order in his renowned al-Muqaddima. He suggests three fundamentals that are vital in the formation and institutionalization of an Islamic state:

- Asabiyah (group feeling), the tendency for solidity and therefore, segmentation;
- The emergence of a verdict structure which assumes leadership functions;
- A huge community (Ummah) based on religion.

The state is defined mainly in terms of its capability to maintain integrity and to protect the Muslim religion. If the state fails to put in force the celestial law, the believer still remains under the responsibility to observe the law. The ruler is given power in the Shariah to do whatever is required to impose the law and provide for the welfare of his citizenry. However, the ruler does not rule alone; he must seek advice from others who are concerned with the affairs of the state. (weissa, 1987)

Pakistan is an 'Islamic Homeland' in subcontinent. Though, the important matter here is to understand the various ideas detained by different leaders when they called for a separate state for Muslims.(coulson, 1964)

It is this question of understanding which provides the background against which the current government's Islamic laws are being promulgated. Since the claim for a Muslim state arose, the role of Islam playing in its political structure has been a challenging issue.

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan prepared a socio-educational restoration movement in the late 1800s. Social and educational development was essential if Muslims hoped to attain power.

As a fact of history, Muslim states have right through the ages maintained pleasant relations with non-Muslims states, and even entered into political alliances with them. The courts of the

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Umayyads in Cordova and those of the Abbasids in Baghdad often hummed with the activity of foreign missions. But the Muslims jurists were not ready to be convinced by these details. They sustained to preach the theory of pure 'jihad' (struggle). It is hard to read their real purpose but it can be easily seen that they certainly erred in their sorting of the world. (khan, 1973)

The prophet also maintained good quality relations with the Christian kings of Ethiopia and Egypt and exchanged gifts with them. State affairs were attached to these relations, which were obviously based on the belief of nonviolent co-existence. Ibnjarra al tabari seems to support this idea, for he writes:

“The prophet also signed a treaty with the polytheists at Hudaybiyah, without demanding any tribute from them. And he said: the Romans would also sign a peaceful treaty with you soon”. (al-tabari, 1933)

Effective Political Confederacy

Effective Political Confederacy may internally tear down the artificial obstacle of national prejudices, and externally become rock-solid international federations, feels confident of them, and is appreciated by the powers of the world. Overall sectarianism remained a great confusion for Muslims, but Pakistan has faced foremost religious desolation by political alignment on religious bases. In Pakistan, each decade has offered a new 'religious oriented slogan'. Zia period presented 'Islamization' (Nizam-e-Islam), Bhutto had 'Islamic Socialism' and then Musharraf brought 'Enlightened Moderation'. Such slogans played a messy role to create more religious based diversions. Internationally, it has been observed that every government presents state interest-based slogan rather than religious covered.

Nevertheless, the ruling class has experiential to justify their political system by exploiting religious organizations. The unelected governments have been involved in arguments that

Islam and democracy do not match. Furthermore, superficial elected governments have used religion to enhance their recognition.

If the dynamics of Islamic reassertion in the earlier period have depended upon the vagaries of Pakistani politics, as a number of chapters in this volume argue, then we might be expecting that the future of Islamization will also be attached to the destiny of political developments that are currently under way in Pakistan.

‘Radicalization’, ‘De-Radicalization’ and ‘Counter-Radicalization’

There is a persistent belief apprehended more generally outside Pakistan than in the country that Pakistan, like Israel and Iran, is one of three confessional states in the world; that like Israel its very foundation was to execute a religious ideal, to create an Islamic state and Islamic culture for the Muslims.

The ‘radicalization’, ‘de-radicalization’ and ‘counter-radicalization’ are used widely, but studies on what exactly ‘radicalization’ is, what causes it and how to ‘de-radicalize’ those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists has so far been a frustrating experience. The popularity of the concept of ‘radicalization’ stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. (jonathan, 2005)

As far as Pakistan is concerned, most of the terrorist elements are a resultant factor of 9/11, and political upheavals have made the situation uncontrollable. Moreover, media has showed more vague pictures like; Swat issue was more dramatized than reality. There are few elements that are working rigidly like Mangal Bagh, Masood, and Haji Auyb Afridi. They are mostly working on religious grounds. Such people are drug smugglers and they are exploiting tribal people and government but nobody brought this fact to the limelight. Now negotiations are one of the viable factors to break this extremist chain.

Negotiation

Negotiation failed because government had promised that drone attacks would get stopped. We have to talk to USA about it but just after all parties' political conference. Waziristan showed their confidence/trust but drone incident happened just after All Parties Conference (APC). And tribal people got flared up again. General Orakzai went there and had negotiation but just after that negotiation, drone attacks again happened. Things should be solved sincerely on a negotiation table. Then Pakistan again said to all Pakistan Ullama organization to play as an arbitrator. Negotiation would be successful if all Pakistan Ullama would give guarantee on behalf of Pakistan government that the government is sincere in negotiations with Taliban.

Arbitrators are:

- Mullana Fazal ur Rehman
- Mullana Sami ul Haq
- MollanaMunawarHassan
- Ahl e Sunnah (Ladhiyanvi)

All arbitrators wanted to find peaceful solution rather than bloodshed. Drone attack should be stop immediately because FATA people consider it as killing innocent people as it happened in Tora Bora where more than seventy thousand Muslims were killed in carpet bombing and through chemical weaponry where only five thousand were Taliban. FATA people do consider that Pakistan government has allowed USA to carry out these attacks in which innocent people are killed. Javed considers that if Pakistan army is conducting many other operations in Pakistan, then they should conduct operation in Waziristan by their own self rather than USA. Eventually, tribal people have hatred against any activity that is being conducted by USA-funded NGOs in educational or health sectors. While some militants are killed in drone attacks, but maximum average of those killed consist of

innocents. If there are militants, then it is the duty of the state to conduct any operation within its territory against any militancy. Therefore, FATA people do not believe in Pakistan government, Javed said it is very important to get people's confidence first by the government. Our government's dual policies have made Pakistanis' mind confused as one political party used to say that 'this is not our fight' and one said that 'war on terror is our fight'. While partially political stability has been established, but confusion among political parties is another hurdle, all parties need to have one common stance in favor of national interest. That's why the government is not getting desired results even after giving negotiation calls with the Taliban. Overall, parties are willing for negotiation with the Taliban except MQM. Javed considers that ten years before there was not a single scenario where veil or beard was a reason to kill people. That scenario emerged after 9/11. In USSR case, there was not even a single case of such rigid kind. Javed also said that 'uncontrolled media' is one of the main reasons to exploit layman's mind. There are two ends of extremism, one is prevailing through 'Takfiris' by TTP's or by Mangal Bagh sort of people, and second is in the name of 'secularism' through western-funded media.

If you want to stop extremism, then the second end must be to create a balanced environment to ensure that extremism does not flourish. Pakistan government should finance media, at least on partial terms for this purpose. Second, if operation is required within the state then Pakistan government and relevant institutions should do it, and it should be the last resort if negotiations are not successful. As we have seen in Kashmiri and in Afghanistan case, everyone stood up for Kashmir and Afghanistan cause, but then merely a single call from USA has made everything vanish. Every Afghan and Kashmiri Mujahid has been declared as militant and government forgot their own previous initiatives in order to work in Kashmir and Afghanistan crisis. Eventually, it was the Mujahidin who were used by USA to fight proxy war for USA in USSR case. But after 9/11, they got violent due to offensive act against them. Now they do not have any other work to do because they are trained only to fight against foes. Now 'Mangal Bagh'

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sort of elements are being used against the state. However, if state would logically take some state level economic measures without having external dictation or pressure in their region then they would come out of their fighting camps and would get involved in some other progressive work (Butt, 2011). If Pakistan wants to resolve this peacefully then any external involvement in FATA region has to stop first. Javed says that tribal leaders consider external aid as a payment of our people's blood so they do not want to let it in their land by any mean.

Afghan Factor

There are three phases of Afghan factor. One when USSR invaded Afghanistan and threatened Pakistan as well and Pakistan got ready to fight proxy for USA and prepared Mujahidin all over Pakistan. Second, when USA went away from Afghanistan after the disintegration of USSR, and left Afghanistan as a 'bleeding wound' which was not a bleeding wound only for USSR but also for Pakistan. Third phase started after 9/11. This time USA has constructed international regime against Islam and Afghanistan and portrayed Osama as playing leading role (Lawrance & ed, 2005). Hence, Musharraf turned the table against the Mujahidin just after having one threatening phone call. That was the time when negotiations with Taliban was required the most via all Pakistan Muslim Ullamahs because Pakistan has all offshoots of Taliban within the state after first and second phase of Afghan factor. So far, Pakistan sent 40 members delegation to Mullah Umer in which Gen. Mahmood and other Pakistani leaders were included. Javed said that Mullah Umer agreed for Osama's trail and suggested a trail bench of three countries. Libya, Saudi Arab and Pakistan were suggested (Musharraf, 2006). Mullah Umer said whosoever is involved in any terrorist activity like 9/11 would get punished by a committee under these three member states. Mullah Umer also agreed that any European or USA agency could investigate Osama under this committee. He also agreed to hand him over to any of these states for trail, but USA completely

denied this proposal and invaded Afghanistan (911 Commission Report, 2002).

Now we are in a third phase where Pakistan is again having Afghan refugees but this time they are not in Pakistan because of love but in anger, and this anger is being exploited by militant elements through radicalization. Secondly, killing of innocent people in Waziristan by drone attacks is also one of the major reasons that is being exploiting by militants.

History is evident that religious elements had always been used brutally by militant and rival elements. Rawalpindi incident in Moharam ul Haram has revived this fact. Although Pakistan has been facing radicalization since 1989, but 9/11 flared it up the most and people saw major militant incidents.

Militancy on Pakistan Western Border

There are many factors that are playing the part to increase the radicalization but two elements are more evident, one is the killing of innocent people by NATO, secondly, misinterpretation of Islamic ideology, like Takfiri that is the offshoots of Deobandi school of thought. And they have interpreted Islam as brutal religion where brutality is the only means to resolve problems and Islamic promulgation through force. They are using every means to promote or to propagate their ideology especially among religiously, socially, and economically deprived people. New generation or fresh minds are their main targets. They have been using electronic media especially FM radio, as it became ossified to speak up against such ideological elements which is dividing Muslim among Muslims. History is also evident of that fact which made religion as the most efficient mean to unite states or nations, and alternatively work as a sharpened knife to divide states or nations even on ethnic basis. If one is serious about countering religious-based elements provoking terrorism, then offensive measures are not quite appropriate because if ideological wars are conducting within the states then offensive measures would lead to a civil war like situation. In Pakistan's case

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ideological war or sectarian war is flaring up within the state, and offensive measures could prove to be more devastative. (telephonic Interview: from Javed Iqbal 'deputy secretary information ' jamatahl e sunat 'Iudhiyanvi' former Sipah e Sahaba, November 2013)

Democratic Evolution and Islamic Narrative

Ideology is a comprehensive vision of philosophical tendencies. Ideologies are systems of abstract applied to public matters and thus make this concept central to politics. The West or orthodox Islam has explained Islamic narrative; both have one common interest that is 'monopoly'. West seeks monopoly on world affairs that leads towards world monopoly. And Islamic orthodox was looking towards monopoly over religion; this makes them as the initiator of Islamic radicalization. Both have made narrative as per their interests. Thereby, Islamic basic concept is quite different from the prevailing narrative. Socially constructed narrative has been consistently encouraged and enforced the Islamic radicalization. Islamic identity based on politics-driven interests has been crafted in such a way that it has become a threat for Pakistan's security. There are few factors that are working on this flawed road.

Islam is under the influence of power politics and imperial effects of economic and military power. Islamic capacity for change is its dominant feature that has always being ignored by western academia to understand its social narrative. "Ideologies therefore, contributed to power politics irrational shields of ideas beneath which they could operate as manifestations of idealism". (vietta, 2013)

During General Zia's rule, it became the norm to treat a religious degree from a Madrassas as equitant of the professional or academic degrees awarded by modern universities and colleges. This shift contributed to the gradual 'Islamization' of the lower ranks of civil service or bureaucracy. Moreover, the professionals

who entered the higher ranks of government, academia were also subjected to years of government sponsored Pakistan studies and religious studies (Islamiyat). Over time, these education initiatives produced a bureaucratic class and military class whose worldviews were deeply influenced by understanding of Islam. Their Islamic education perfectly blended with scientific and social education but the negative aspect was the radical elements that sowed its seed due to extreme Islamic approach. Radical version of Islam enhanced due to lack of accountability in religious institution and among preachers (Mullah).

Major Facilitations for Radicals in Waziristan

Radicals are having power over ‘cognition’ due to political ignorance and economical marginalization in tribal areas. They are having religious connotations as required that have assimilations with tribal customs. Eventually, they made themselves logically coherent for tribal people. Afghan element is like a strategic depth for militant elements. In a way they are having external manpower and financial assistance from outside.

Conclusion

The ultimate purpose of Islam is to encompass the whole of mankind and to build a common society based on a single faith and a single law. Islam is not a mere set of rituals whose performance entitles one to the pleasure of God or offers spiritual satisfaction to the performer. It embraces the whole of life, and the life of the individual is but a drop in the life of the community. Now a days so -called believers are a real harm for Islam.

Recommendations

Pakistan foreign policy should be free from any external or internal pressure; focus should be on state interest by the wishes of people. Mostly, tribes belong to ‘Deobandi’ school of thought and are influenced when Mullana Sami ul Haq, Mullana Fazul ur

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Rehman and Ladhiyanvi get them together for negotiation with the tribal leaders. Then sincere people would follow the state's sincere intention. But few Mahsud type tribes would get annoyed but by this way at least external elements would loosen their influence on innocent people and on impartial tribes. That would be a great loss for militant elements, as they would loosen their ties with native tribes and governments would get tribal support for state. Fight against militancy and radicalization would be easier, like in Sri Lanka 'Tamil tigers' were working and government could not even crush them for the last 36 years. So we do not expect Pakistan case would be sorted in days, or weeks or even months. But if we follow the same lines as the study has described then we can sort out things, at least in one political tenure. Otherwise Pakistan is not in such state where further 10 chaotic years could bear on its own land and against its own people. Javed said that, there are few tribes, who are quite rigid in their values, and 'takfiri' ideology is most compelling for them due to its rigidness and these tribes are big support of militant elements. 'Takfiri' element is being used to make them more radicalized against Pakistan and the solution to break up their ties is to divide them on negotiation table through Ullamah arbitrators and local mullahs' and training through Pakistan government then their logistic support would decrease and then fight against specific remaining militant would get easier than ever. Those elements who are spreading radicalization via 'Takfiri' sort of ideologies are basically defaming Islam and Pakistan in a row. In fact they do not belong to Islam and Pakistan in any way.(interview)

Jihad is conditional according to situation like within state 'we could follow jihad bilqalm' when Kashmir or Afghanistan or Bosnia case occurs then Muslims are allowed to stop aggression against another Muslim by hand. Otherwise within the state; 'jihad bil talwar' is state's own responsibility. If any aggressive or potential offensive organization considers Pakistan as non-Islamic state then how we could negotiate with them further. Javed said, since 1973 there is not even a single Islamic amendment, whereas it was government promises in 1973 that remaining Islamic laws

would follow and included within six more years that was a foremost mistrust among mullah or government. Since that time political stability was not rapidly exercised in Pakistan. Now a day's an issue emerged that Islamiyat study in school system is getting amended. Quranic and Ahdees are being eliminated from school syllabus and this act is most hurting for all patriotic Islamic organizations as well. Government has to take immediate steps to stop such conspiracies and find out those responsible for mischief. In a way, government could trace out the 'silent militant' element in state. They are providing grounds to Islamic organizations to get flared up them against the government. (Interview: from Javed Iqbal 'deputy secretary information ' jamatahl e sunat 'ludhiyanvi' former Sipah e Sahaba)

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