The long-awaited military operation in North Waziristan is regarded as the would-be `decisive phase` of Pakistan`s six-year counter-insurgency campaign. US war planners consider an operation in North Waziristan vitally important for dismantling key Taliban outfits and their Al Qaeda affiliates across the Durand Line.
The American media reports that Pakistan is not willing to take the fight to North Waziristan, insinuating that there is a divergence of interests. US concerns are growing.
But according to ISPR spokesman Gen Athar Abbas, opening a new front in North Waziristan at this stage will undo the gains in Swat, South Waziristan and other areas. Army officials say they need to consolidate the areas recently cleared and that they cannot turn towards North Waziristan until the ongoing operations are completed.
However, the western media perpetuates popular stereotypes in terms of the rules of the Pakistan Army`s engagement with militant networks in North Waziristan, particularly Gul Bahadur`s group and the Haqqani network.
Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a 37-year-old Taliban strategist from Madda Khel, North Waziristan, appears the most influential man in the region. He has maintained on-and-off relations with both the Pakistani government and the commanders of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). His loyalty to Mullah Omar brings him closer to Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Nazir too. All these leaders have strong ideological and strategic attachments with the Taliban movement in Afghanistan under Omar`s umbrella.
Most western experts opine that since militant groups in North Waziristan mainly aim to launch jihad in Afghanistan against the western coalition, they don`t pose a serious threat to Pakistan. In other words, these groups are allegedly Pakistan`s strategic assets with the country`s primary concern being the Punjabi Taliban.
In recent months, almost all major attacks inside Punjab have been claimed by the Punjab wing of TTP, which is itself based in North Waziristan and Orakzai Agency. Despite Pakistan`s full-fledged operation in Orakzai and other parts of FATA, the western world is not convinced. The belief persists that the Pakistan Army continues to be affected by the concept of good and bad Taliban.
In fact, Pakistan`s military strategy at the operational level is confronted with some major challenges.
First, the two major routes to North Waziristan are the Bannu-Miramshah road and the Kohat-Thall-Mirali road. The army needs both these routes safe for troop mobility and logistics. The latter traverses a narrow strip between the mountain ranges of Hangu and Orakzai Agency. From Kohat to Thall, this road lies roughly one to five kilometres from the Taliban-dominated areas of Orakzai and Kurram agencies. The army needs all such Taliban pockets to be cleared. It has secured almost 70 per cent of the area along this road but some vulnerable gaps remain.
Secondly, as the operation is concluded in lower Orakzai Agency, the Taliban are pushed back towards upper Orakzai which touches central Kurram, the area under Mullah Tofan`s control. The upper Orakzai area is of critical importance to both the Taliban and the army. Defeating the Taliban here will mean that they are being pushed into the adjacent central Kurram, likely to be the last battleground of the Taliban hiding in Kurram Agency. They cannot move westward into the Shia-dominated part of the region, nor can they risk confrontation in the north that is dominated by the forces of Mehbub Mullah, the ameer of Ansar-ul-Islam and the traditional arch-rival of the TTP. Defeating the Taliban in central Kurram will mean the group`s complete defeat in the Kurram and Orakzai agencies.
Third, any full-fledged offensive in North Waziristan may result in an influx of Taliban militants into South Waziristan, probably the area of the Wazir tribe controlled by Mullah Nazir. The army needs to calculate carefully, therefore. Further, if Mullah Nazir joins any army-Taliban confrontation in the north, additional military forces may be required.
Fourth comes the crucial matter of public support for the military operation, particularly in North Waziristan. The army thinks that it would be possible to enlist the Waziri tribes of the north in the fight against the insurgents. Yet any attempt to rush them may backfire.
Unlike the TTP, Gul Bahadur`s group and the Haqqani network have significant support in many Deobandi madressahs across the country. The army cannot ignore the possibility of open and demonstrated support in any form during the combat against Gul Bahadur and Haqqani`s men.
An attached problem is the IDP crisis. Until the Mehsud IDPs (almost 0.4 million) in Tank and D.I. Khan districts return to their homes in South Waziristan, the operation in North Waziristan would push Pakistan towards another IDP crisis, possibly in Bannu and Thall.
Moreover, the effectiveness of the Council of United Mujahideen, an umbrella organisation comprising the TTP, Gul Bahadur`s group and Mullah Nazir formed in February 2009, will define the magnitude of militant resistance. There are rumours that Bahadur left the council and while he has made no formal announcement, he certainly has not coordinated operations with the umbrella group. This signals that the army is preparing ground by first splitting and weakening the groups.
With a 40,000-men deployment in North Waziristan, the Pakistan Army would have a sound position. Taliban militants in North Waziristan number between 15,000 and 40,000 including militants that are loosely or opportunistically connected with Taliban groups. The support of these people is vital for both the Taliban and the army.
The number of casualties on both sides is speculated as likely to be higher than expected if the army proceeds with the model it used in Swat and South Waziristan. The foreign militants and those who have come from other districts will take the battle to the last eventuality.
The army will employ a different model of military operation, thereby securing the maximum number of people while selecting very few targets for the initial assault. The leadership of the Haqqani network and Bahadur`s group might either be taken into custody or be given safe passage towards Kurram Agency or the Mullah Nazir-controlled part of South Waziristan.
The recent Shia-Sunni peace talks in Kurram Agency, in which Haqqani`s men are negotiators, is widely considered a step to seek new hideouts for Haqqani`s and Bahadur`s men. Yet while the picture remains unclear, it is likely that the Pakistan Army will further delay an operation in North Waziristan for at least four to six months, terming it impractical and strategically unwise.
The writer works as Research Fellow at FATA Research Centre.
